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Abstract—How can we detect suspicious users in large online
networks? Online popularity of a user or product (via follows,
page-likes, etc.) can be monetized on the premise of higher ad
click-through rates or increased sales. Web services and social
networks which incentivize popularity thus suffer from a major
problem of fake connections from link fraudsters looking to
make a quick buck. Typical methods of catching this suspicious
behavior use spectral techniques to spot large groups of often
blatantly fraudulent (but sometimes honest) users. However,
small-scale, stealthy attacks may go unnoticed due to the nature
of low-rank eigenanalysis used in practice.
In this work, we take an adversarial approach to find and
prove claims about the weaknesses of modern, state-of-the-art
spectral methods and propose FBOX, an algorithm designed
to catch small-scale, stealth attacks that slip below the radar.
Our algorithm has the following desirable properties: (a) it has
theoretical underpinnings, (b) it is shown to be highly effective
on real data and (c) it is scalable (linear on the input size). We
evaluate FBOX on a large, public 41.7 million node, 1.5 billion
edge who-follows-whom social graph from Twitter in 2010 and
with high precision identify many suspicious accounts which have
persisted without suspension even to this day.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an online network, how can we distinguish honest users
from deceptive ones? Since many online services rely on
machine learning algorithms to recommend relevant content
to their users, it is crucial to their performance that user
feedback be legitimate and indicative of true interests. “Fake”
links via the use of sockpuppet/bot accounts can enable ar-
bitrary (frequently spammy or malicious) users and products
of varying nature seem credible and popular, thus degrading
the online experience of users. Unsurprisingly, numerous sites
such as buy1000followers.co, boostlikes.com and
buyamazonreviews.com exist to provide services such
as fake Twitter followers, Facebook page-likes and Amazon
product reviews for typically just a few dollars per one-
thousand fake links.
Here we focus exactly on the link-fraud problem. We take
an adversarial approach to illustrate when and how current
methods fail to detect fraudsters and design a new complemen-
tary algorithm, FBOX, to spot attackers who evade these state-
of-the-art techniques. Figure 1 showcases several suspicious
accounts spotted by FBOX– we elaborate on three of them,
marked using the triangle, square and star glyphs. All three
are identified as outliers in the FBOX Spectral Reconstruction
Map (SRM) shown in Figure 1b. The corresponding Twitter
profiles are shown in Figure 1c, and further manual inspection
shows that all three accounts exhibit suspicious behavior:
• triangle: it has only 2 tweets but over 1000 followers
• square: it is part of a 50-clique with suspicious names
• star: it posts tweets advertising a link fraud service
Our main contributions are the following:
1) Theoretical analysis: We prove limitations of the detec-
tion range of spectral-based methods.
2) FBOX algorithm: We introduce FBOX, a scalable method
that boxes-in attackers, since it spots small-scale, stealth
attacks which evade spectral methods.
3) Effectiveness on real data: We apply FBOX to a real,
41.7 million node, 1.5 billion edge Twitter who-follows-
whom social graph from 2010 and identify many still-
active accounts with suspicious follower/followee links,
spammy Tweets and otherwise strange behavior.
Reproducibility: Our code is available at http://www.cs.
cmu.edu/∼neilshah/code/. The Twitter dataset is also publicly
available as cited in [11].
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We begin by reviewing in detail several of the current state-
of-the-art methods in web fraud and spam detection. Table
I shows a qualitative comparison between various link fraud
detection methods.
A. Spectral methods
We classify techniques that analyze the latent factors pro-
duced in graph-based eigenanalysis or matrix/tensor decom-
position as spectral methods. These algorithms seek to find
patterns in the graph decompositions to extract coherent groups
of users or objects. Prakash et al’s work on the EigenSpokes
pattern [19] and Jiang et al’s work on spectral subspaces of
social networks [9] are two such approaches that we will
primarily focus on and which have been employed on real
datasets to detect suspicious link behavior. [21] uses a similar
analysis of spectral patterns, but focuses on random link attacks
(RLAs), which have different properties than link fraud and
therefore produce different patterns.
These works utilize the Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) of the input graph’s adjacency matrix in order to group
similar users and objects based on their projections. Recall
that the SVD of a u× o matrix A is defined as A = UΣVT,
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Fig. 1: FBOX catches stealth attacks which are missed by spectral methods. (a) shows a spectral subspace plots on the Twitter
social graph which identifies blatant attacks but ignores stealth attackers (at the origin). (b) portrays how the proposed FBOX
ISRM (In-link Spectral Reconstruction Map) can describe these users by their reconstruction degree and identifies several with
improbably poor reconstruction. (c) shows their suspicious profiles with matching glyphs (see text for details).
TABLE I: Qualitative comparison between FBOX and other link fraud detection methods.
P r o p e r t i e s M e t h o d s
SPOKEN Spectral Subspace Plotting COPYCATCH ODDBALL FBOX
Detects stealth attacks 8 8 8 8 4
Camouflage resistant 8 4 4 8 4
Offers visualization 4 4 8 8 4
where U and V are u × u and o × o matrices respectively
containing the left and right singular vectors, and Σ is a
u × o diagonal matrix containing the singular values of A.
Both papers note the presence of unusual patterns (axis-aligned
spokes, tilting rays, pearl-like clusters, etc.) when plotting the
singular vectors Ui and Uj for some i, j ≤ k, where k is
the SVD decomposition rank, indicative of suspicious lockstep
behavior between similar users. The authors use these patterns
to chip out communities of similar users from input graphs.
Beyond directly searching for suspicious behavior, spectral
methods have been used for a variety of applications. [14]
builds off the above work to use tensor decomposition for
network intrusion detection. [2] proposes a robust collaborative
filtering model that clusters latent parameters to limit the
impact of fraudulent ratings from potential adversaries. [17]
and [8] propose using eigenvectors of graph decompositions
for graph partitioning and community detection.
Although spectral methods have shown promise in finding
large communities and blatantly suspicious behavior in online
networks, they are universally vulnerable given knowledge of
the decomposition rank k used in a given implementation. All
techniques operating on large graphs use such a parameter
in practical implementations given that matrix decompositions
are very computationally expensive [10]. Previous spectral
methods have generally chosen small values of k < 100 for
purposes of computability. As we will show in Section III,
knowledge of k or the associated singular value threshold
(inferrable from sample datasets online) enables an intelligent
adversary to engineer attacks to fall below the detection
threshold.
B. Graph-traversal based methods
A wide variety of algorithms have been proposed to directly
traverse the graph to find or stop suspicious behavior. [20] of-
fers a random walk algorithm for detecting RLAs. [6] proposes
a PageRank-like approach for penalizing promiscuous users
on Twitter, but is unfortunately only shown to be effective in
detecting already caught spammers rather than detecting new
ones. [18] uses belief propagation to find near-bipartite cores
of attackers on eBay.
However, most similar in application is Beutel et al’s
COPYCATCH algorithm to find suspicious lockstep behavior in
Facebook Page Likes [3]. COPYCATCH is a clustering method
that seeks to find densely connected groups in noisy data
through restricted graph traversal, motivated with the intuition
of fraud taking the form of naı¨vely created bipartite cores in the
input graph. The algorithm uses local search in the graph to
find dense temporally-coherent near-bipartite cores (TNBCs)
given attack size, time window and link density parameters.
Clustering methods like COPYCATCH are able to avoid
detection problems caused by camouflage (connections created
by attackers to legitimate pages or people for the purposes of
appearing like honest users) given that they ignore such links
if the attacker is party to any TNBC. However, identifying the
appropriate “minimal attack” parameters is nontrivial. Non-
conservative parameter estimates will result in many uncaught
attackers whereas excessively conservative estimates will result
in numerous false positives. From an adversarial point-of-view,
we argue that the cost of incurring false positives and troubling
honest users is likely not worth the added benefit of catching
an increased number of attackers after some point. Therefore,
an alternative approach to catch stealth attacks falling below
chosen thresholds is necessary.
(a) Naı¨ve (b) Staircase (c) Random graph
Fig. 2: (a), (b) and (c) show the different types of adversarial
attacks we characterize.
C. Feature-based methods
Spam and fraud detection has classically been framed as a
feature-based classification problem, e.g. based on the words
in spam email or URLs in tweets. However, [7] focuses on
malicious Tweets and finds that blacklisting approaches are
too slow to stem the spread of Twitter spam. ODDBALL [1]
proposes features based on egonets to find anomalous users
on weighted graphs. [4] and [13] take a game theoretic
approach to learning simple classifiers over generic features
to detect spam. While related in the adversarial perspective,
these approaches focus on general feature-based classification
as used for spam email, rather than graph analysis as is needed
for link fraud detection.
III. AN ADVERSARIAL ANALYSIS - OUR PERSPECTIVE
In this section, we examine the exploitability of state-of-
the-art methods from an adversarial point-of-view and present
lemmas and theorems detailing the limitations of these meth-
ods. Particularly, we demonstrate through theoretical analysis
that existing methods are highly vulnerable to evasion by
intelligent attackers. Table II contains a comprehensive list of
symbols and corresponding definitions used in our paper.
Given knowledge of the detection threshold used by a
certain service, how can an attacker engineer smart attacks
on that service to avoid detection by fraud detection methods?
Formally, we pose the following adversarial problem:
Problem 1: Given an input graph adjacency matrix A, with
rows and columns corresponding to users and objects, engi-
neer a stealth attack which falls just below the minimum sized
attack detectable by modern state-of-the-art fraud detection
methods.
As previously described, most detection methods focus on
finding fairly blatant bipartite cores or cliques in the input
graph. Therefore, if an adversary knows the minimum size
attack that detection methods will catch, he can carefully
engineer attacks to fall just below that threshold. For clustering
approaches like COPYCATCH, this threshold is clearly set
based on input parameters, and the attacker can simply use
fewer accounts than specifiedto avoid detection.
However, for spectral methods like SPOKEN, the possible
attack size for an adversary is unclear. We argue that from an
adversarial perspective, these spectral methods have a detection
threshold based on the input graph’s singular values. For a rank
k SVD used in these methods, this threshold is governed by
the kth largest singular value, σk. In practice, an adversary
could estimate σk from the results of various experimental
attacks conducted at distinct scales, or by conducting analysis
on publicly available social network data. Once an adversary
has such an estimate, we show that it is easy to conduct attacks
on the graph adjacency matrix A that will necessarily lie below
this threshold and avoid detection.
To analyze what type of attacks can evade detection by
spectral methods, let us consider that there are c customers
who have each commissioned an attacker with f nodes in his
botnet for s fraudulent actions (page likes, followers, etc.),
where s ≤ f . This type of attack can be considered as an
injected submatrix S of size f × c, where rows correspond to
attacker nodes (controlled by a single fraudulent operator) in
the set of users (F ⊂ U) and the columns represent customers
in the set of objects (C ⊂ P). In this formulation, the desired
in-degree of all nodes in S is s.
As described earlier, an attack will only be detected by
a spectral algorithm if it appears in the top k singular val-
ues/vectors. Therefore, our goal as an adversary becomes to
understand the spectral properties of our attacks and ensure
that they do not project in the rank k decomposition. We
can consider the spectral properties of S in isolation from the
rest of the graph, as it is well known that the spectrum of a
disconnected graph is the union of the spectra of its connected
components. From this, we deduce that it is sufficient to
consider only the representation of S and ignore the remainder
of A when trying to minimize the leading singular value that
the attack contributes to the singular spectrum of A. Therefore,
an attack S with leading singular value σ′ will go undetected
by spectral methods if σ′ < σk, where σk is the kth largest
singular value computed for the adjacency matrix A.
Having reduced the problem of adversarial injection to
distributing some amount of fraudulent activity over the f × c
matrix S, we next consider several distinct patterns of attack
which characterize types of fraudulent behavior discovered in
the analysis of prior work. Specifically, we explore three fraud
distribution techniques: naı¨ve, staircase and random graph
injections. Figure 2 gives a pictorial representation of each
of these types of attacks. We evaluate the suitability of each
attack for an adversary on the basis of the leading singular
value that the pattern generates.
A. Naı¨ve Injection
This is the most notable attack pattern considered in prior
work. The naı¨ve injection distributes the sc total fraudulent
actions into an s× c submatrix of S. Thus, only s of the f at-
tacker nodes perform any fraudulent actions, and all fraudulent
actions are distributed between these s nodes. In graph terms,
this is equivalent to introducing a s × c complete bipartite
core. Such an attack corresponds to attackers naı¨vely linking
the same set of s nodes to each of the c customers, producing
a full block in A. Figure 2a shows a visual representation of
such an attack.
Lemma 1: The leading singular value of an s× c bipartite
core injection is σ1 =
√
cs.
Proof: Since S is a full block, where Si,j = 1 for all i ≤ s,
j ≤ c, SST must be an s× s matrix where SSTi,j = c for all
i, j ≤ s. By the Perron-Frobenius Theorem for non-negative
TABLE II: Frequently used symbols and definitions
Symbol Definition
u and o Number of user and object nodes described by the input graph
U and P Sets of indexed rows and columns corresponding to user and object nodes in the input graph
A u× o input graph adjacency matrix where Ax,y = 1 if a link exists between user node x and object node y
f and c Number of attacker and customer nodes described by the attack graph
s Number of fraudulent actions each customer node has paid commission for in the attack graph
F and C Sets of indexed rows and columns corresponding to attacker nodes and customer nodes in the attack graph
S f × c attack graph adjacency matrix where Sx,y = 1 if a link exists between attacker node x and customer node y
k Decomposition rank parameter used by spectral methods
λk and σk kth largest eigenvalue and singular value of a given matrix (largest values for k = 1)
m, n and p Bipartite core size and edge probability parameters used by clustering methods
matrices, the leading eigenvalue of SST λ1 is bounded by
min
i
∑
j
SSTi,j ≤ λ1 ≤ max
i
∑
j
SSTi,j for i ≤ s
Given that the row sums are equal to cs, λ1 = cs for SST.
Since the singular values of S are equal to the square roots of
the eigenvalues of SST by definition, it follows naturally that
the leading singular value is σ1 =
√
cs for S.
B. Staircase Injection
The staircase injection (discovered in [9]) evenly distributes
cs fraudulent actions over f attacker nodes. However, unlike
in the naı¨ve method, where each node that performs any
fraudulent actions does so for each of the c customers, the
staircase method forces different subsets of nodes to associate
with different subsets of customers. This distribution results in
the S matrix looking like a staircase of links. Figure 2b shows
a visual representation of such an attack.
We restrict our analysis here to staircase injections in which
all users have equal out degrees o and equal in degrees i,
though o need not equal i. When out degrees and in degrees are
not equal, users and objects do not have uniform connectivity
properties which complicates calculations. In particular, we
assume that the periodicity of the staircase pattern, given
by t = lcm(s, f)/s is such that t|c to ensure this criteria.
However, for large values of c/t, σ1 ≈ s
√
c/f given LLN.
Theorem 1: The leading singular value of an s, c, f stair-
case injection is σ1 = s
√
c/f .
Proof: The staircase injection is equivalent to a random
graph-injection of f × c with edge probability p = s/f . The
reduction is omitted due to space constraints. Such a random
graph injection has leading singular value s
√
c/f (proof given
in Section III-C).
C. Random Graph Injection
The random graph injection bears close resemblance to
the near-bipartite core with density p attack noted in [3]. The
random graph injection distributes ≈ sc fraudulent actions over
the f attacker nodes approximately evenly. Figure 2c shows a
visual representation of such an attack. This approach assigns
each node a fixed probability p = sc/cf = s/f of performing
a fraudulent operation associated with one of the c customers.
Given LLN, the average number of fraudulent operations per
customer will be close to the expected value of s, and as a
result the total number of fraudulent actions will be close to
sc. The random graph injection is similar to the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
model defined by G(n, p) [5], except we consider a directed
graph scenario with cf possible edges. However, as Erdo¨s and
Re´nyi studied the asymptotic behavior of random graphs, their
results are applicable here as well.
Theorem 2: The leading singular value of an s, c, f di-
rected random bipartite graph is σ1 ∼ s
√
c/f .
Proof: Given that probability of an edge between an
attacker node and a customer is p = s/f , it is apparent that
E(SSTi,j) = p
2c for i, j ≤ f
since the value of each cell in the f × f matrix SST will
be a result of the inner product of the corresponding row and
column vectors of length c with probability p of a nonzero
entry at any i ≤ c. Since each row in SST has f entries,
E(
∑
j
SSTi,j) = p
2cf for i ≤ f
By the Perron-Frobenius theorem for non-negative matrices,
the leading eigenvalue λ1 of SST will be bounded by
min
i
∑
j
SSTi,j ≤ λ1 ≤ max
i
∑
j
SSTi,j for i ≤ f
Given that the row sums are all approximately equal to p2cf =
cs2/f (exactly equal to cs2/f if edges in S are perfectly
uniformly distributed), the leading eigenvalue is λ1 ∼ cs2/f
for SST. Since the singular values of S are equal to the square
roots of the eigenvalues of SST, it follows naturally that the
leading singular value is σ1 = s
√
c/f for S.
Note that the staircase injection discussed earlier in this
section is exactly the case of edges in S being perfectly
uniformly distributed. For this reason, the leading eigenvalue
of SST, where S is an s, c, f staircase injection is λ1 = cs2/f ,
and thus the leading singular value is σ1 = s
√
c/f for S.
D. Implications and Empirical Analysis
Thus far, we have discussed three different types of po-
tential attack patterns for a fixed number of fradulent actions
and theoretically derived expressions concerning the leading
singular value that they contribute to the singular spectrum of
A. Two of the attack patterns, the staircase and random graph
injections, produce leading singular values σ1 of exactly and
approximately s
√
c/f respectively. Conversely, naı¨ve injection
results in a leading singular value of σ1 =
√
cs. Given these
results, it is apparent that naı¨ve injection is the least suitable
for an adversarial use, since it will necessarily produce a larger
singular value than the other two methods given that s ≤ f .
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Fig. 3: Skewed singular value distribution in real networks — spectral (k-rank SVD) approaches suffer from stealth attacks. (a),
(b), (c) and (d) show distributions for corresponding networks which allow stealth attacks capable of signficantly impacting local
network structure to go undetected.
TABLE III: Graphs used for empirical analysis
Graph Nodes Edges
Twitter [11] 41.7 million 1.5 billion
Amazon [15] 6m users & 2m products 29 million
Netflix [16] 480k users & 17k videos 99 million
Epinions [12] 131,828 841,372
Slashdot [12] 82,144 549,202
Wikipedia [12] 8274 114,040
This result is intuitive: the leading eigenvalue of a matrix is
a measure of effective connectivity, and packing fraudulent
actions into a full block matrix results in higher connectivity
than spreading the actions out over a large, sparse matrix. Our
results beget two important conclusions:
1) Fraud detection tools must consider modes of attack
other than naı¨ve injection — more intelligent and less
detectable means of attack exist and are being used.
2) Given knowledge of the effective singular value threshold
σk used by spectral detection methods, or m, n, p
parameter choice for clustering based methods, attackers
can easily engineer attacks of scale up to just below the
threshold without consequence.
To demonstrate that this leaves a significant opening for
attackers, we analyze the distribution of singular values for a
variety of real world graphs and show just how easy it is to
construct attacks which slip below the radar. In particular, we
compute the SVD for six different real world graphs: Twitter’s
who-follows-whom social graph, Amazon’s bipartite graph of
user reviews for products, Netflix’s graph of user reviews for
movies, Epinions’s network of who-trusts-whom, Slashdot’s
friends/foe social graph, and Wikipedia’s bipartite graph of
votes for administrators. For each graph, we turn it into a
binary bipartite graph and compute the SVD for a fixed rank.
The properties of the datasets can be seen in Table III and the
results can be seen in Figure 3.
In Figure 3a we observe the top k = 50 singular values
for the Twitter graph. We see that the largest singular value
is over 6000, but as k increases the singular values begin
to settle around 1000, with σ50 = 960.1. Lemma 1 implies
that an attacker controlling 960 accounts could use them
to follow 960 other accounts and avoid projecting onto any
of the top 50 singular vectors. Note that Lemma 1 also
implies that an attacker could add 92 thousand followers to
10 lucky accounts and also go undetected. These are very
large numbers of followers that could significantly shift the
perception of popularity or legitimacy of accounts. Common
spectral approaches would fail to detect such attacks.
A similar analysis can be made for the other graphs. Figure
3b shows that σ50 = 141.6 in the Amazon review graph.
Therefore, attackers could add 140 reviews for 140 products
without projecting onto the top 50 singular vectors. Consid-
ering the average product has 12.5 reviews and a product in
the 99th percentile has 187 reviews, 140 reviews is sufficiently
large to sway perception of a product on Amazon.
As seen in Figure 3c, we find that σ50 = 309.7 and σ100 =
243.4 for the Netflix ratings graph. Therefore, attackers could
naı¨vely add an injection of 240 ratings to 240 videos from 240
accounts and avoid detection in the top 100 singular vectors.
For the Epinions network, we see in Figure 3d that
σ50 = 31.4. Although this value is much smaller than that
for other graphs, the Epinions network is small and sparse,
with the average user having an in-degree of 6.4. Based on
this singular value, an attacker adding 30 edges (statements of
trust or distrust) to 30 users would significantly influence the
external view of those users.
In Slashdot’s friend vs. foe graph, σ50 = 23.9, as seen in
Figure 3d. This means that attackers could add 23 ratings for
23 users while avoiding spectral detection. Considering that the
average in-degree for accounts in this network is 6.7, adding
23 edges would significantly impact the perception of a user.
Lastly, we examine the graph of 2794 administrative elec-
tions on Wikipedia. As shown in Figure 3d, σ50 = 17.5. This
implies that 17 users could for 17 elections all vote together
and avoid detection. In fact, 31% of elections were settled by
17 votes or less. An attacker could also modify the shape of the
attack such that 5 users would each receive 57 votes, enough
to win 72%. Given an attack of this scale, a small group of
accounts could cooperate to unfairly rig election outcomes.
From these examples across a variety of networks, we see
that using spectral approaches for catching fraud leaves a wide
opening for attackers to manipulate online graphs.
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR FRAUD BEHAVIORS
As demonstrated in Section III, current detection methods
are effective in catching blatant attacks, but drop in efficacy
TABLE IV: Types of attacks and suitable detection techniques
No Camouflage Camouflage
Blatant Attacks SPOKEN;
COPYCATCH
Spectral subspace plotting;
COPYCATCH
Stealth Attacks (proposed) FBOX (proposed) FBOX
as the attack size decreases. Though the scale of attacks de-
tected is defined differently for various datasets given distinct
decomposition rank k, such a detectability cross-over point
necessarily exists given the well-defined nature of the singular
value produced by common types of attacks. In this section,
we give a broader overview of possible attack modes and the
capabilities of current methods in dealing with them. Table IV
illustrates how current techniques fit into our classification of
suitable defenses against four different attack types and how
the proposed FBOX algorithm can fill in the remaining holes
to provide a more holistic framework for fraud detection.
The four types of attacks we broach in this work are
classified based on two dichotomies — the scale of attack
and the presence of camouflage. The scale of attack concerns
whether an attack of some size defined in terms of the
aformentioned s, c and f parameters in the context of a given
dataset (and decomposition rank k for spectral methods), is
detectable or not. The attack could be staged using any of
the fraud distribution patterns discussed in Section III. In the
context of clustering methods, scale is more formally defined
by the minimal attack size parameters used. Camouflage refers
to uncommissioned actions conducted by attackers in order
to appear more like honest users in the hopes of avoiding
detection. For example, camouflage on Twitter is most com-
monly seen as attackers following some honest users for free
in addition to paid customers. Attacks with camouflage are
more difficult to detect than those without, given the increased
likelihood of a practitioner to overlook suspicious actions.
A. Blatant Attack/No Camouflage
Of the four types, blatant attacks without camouflage are
the easiest to spot. Blatant attacks whose singular values
are above the threshold σk and thus appear in the rank-k
decomposition of spectral methods produce spoke-like patterns
and can be identified using SPOKEN. It is worth noting that
SPOKEN is a method to chip out large communities from
graphs, and not necessarily attackers. Verification of the blatant
lockstep behavior as fraudulent is required in this case.
B. Blatant Attack/Camouflage
Naturally, blatant attacks with camouflage are more diffi-
cult to spot than without. Though the singular values of the
attacks are above the threshold σk and the associated singular
vectors appear in the rank-k decomposition of spectral meth-
ods, Jiang et al. showed that rather than axis-aligned spokes,
the spectral subspace plots showed tilting rays. COPYCATCH
is also effective in detecting blatant attacks with camouflage
(provided that the parameter choices are sufficiently large to
limit the rate of false positives), given that camouflage is
ignored in the case that an m, n, p near-bipartite core is found
for a subset of U and P for a fixed snapshot of the input graph.
C. Stealth Attack/No Camouflage
As concluded in Section III, current detection schemes are
highly vulnerable to stealth attacks engineered to fall below
parameter thresholds of σk for spectral methods or m, n, p for
clustering methods. To the best of our knowledge, no previous
technique has been able to successfully and effectively identify
users involved in these types of attacks. Though stealth attacks
may be individually of lesser consequence to detect than larger
cases of fraud, they have the insidious property of being able
to achieve the same number of fraudulent actions in a more
controlled and less detectable manner at the cost of simply
creating more fraud-related accounts. In response to this threat,
we propose the FBOX algorithm for identifying such attacks
in Section V and demonstrate its effectiveness in Section VI.
D. Stealth Attack/Camouflage
Given that identifying small scale attacks has thus far
been an open problem in the context of fraud detection,
the problem of identifying these with camouflage has also
gone unaddressed. The difficulty in dealing with camouflage
is particularly apparent when considering user accounts with
few outgoing or incoming links, as is typically the case with
smaller attacks. From the perspective of a practitioner, it may
appear that a truly fraudulent account is mostly honest but
with a few suspicious or uncharacteristic links (insufficient to
mark as fraudulent) or infrequently/unsavvily used due to the
small number of total links. We demonstrate in Section VI that
FBOX is robust to such smart attacks with moderate amounts
of camouflage on real social network data.
V. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Thus far, we have seen how existing state-of-the-art tech-
niques have firm effective detection thresholds and are entirely
ineffective in detecting stealth attacks that fall below this
threshold. Given this problem, it is natural to consider the
following question — how can we identify the many numerous
small scale attacks that are prone to slipping below the radar
of existing techniques? In this section, we formalize our
problem definition and propose FBOX as a suitable method
for addressing this problem.
A. Problem Formulation
We identify the major problem to be addressed as follows:
Problem 2: Given an input graph adjacency matrix A, with
rows and columns corresponding to users and objects (could
be pages, articles, etc. or even other users), identify stealth
attacks which are undetectable given a desired decomposition
rank-k for A (undetectable in that their singular values fall
below the threshold σk).
Note that Problem 2 is an exact foil to Problem 1. In this
paper, we primarily focus on smart attacks which fall below
a practitioner-defined spectral threshold, given that a number
of previous works mentioned have tackled the problem of
discovering blatant attacks. Given that this body of work is
effective in detecting such attacks, we envision that the best
means of boxing in attackers is a complementary approach to
existing methods, as our analysis in Section IV is indicative
of the lack of suitability of a one-size-fits-all technique for
catching all attackers.
Require: Input graph adjacency matrix A,
Decomposition rank k,
Threshold τ
1: userCulprits = {}
2: objectCulprits = {}
3: outDegrees = rowSum(A)
4: inDegrees = colSum(A)
5: [U,Σ,V] = svd(A, k)
6: for each row i in UΣ do
7: recOutDegs = ‖(UΣ)i‖22
8: end for
9: for each row j in VΣ do
10: recInDegs = ‖(VΣ)j‖22
11: end for
12: for each unique od in outDegrees do
13: nodeSet = find(outDegrees == od)
14: recOutDegSet = recOutDegs(nodeSet)
15: recThreshold = percentile(recOutDegSet, τ)
16: for each node n in nodeSet do
17: if recOutDegs(n) ≤ recThreshold then
18: userCulprits = userCulprits + n
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: for each unique id in inDegrees do
23: nodeSet = find(inDegrees == id)
24: recInDegSet = recInDegs(nodeSet)
25: recThreshold = percentile(recInDegSet, τ)
26: for each node n in nodeSet do
27: if recInDegs(n) ≤ recThreshold then
28: objectCulprits = objectCulprits + n
29: end if
30: end for
31: end for
32: return userCulprits,
objectCulprits
Algorithm 1: FBOX algorithm pseudocode
B. Description
As per the problem formulation, we seek to develop a
solely graph-based method, which will be able to complement
existing fraud detection techniques by discerning previously
undetectable attacks. In Section III, we demonstrated that
smaller attacks are particularly characterized by comparatively
low singular values (below σk), and thus do not appear in the
singular vectors given by a rank k decomposition. Assuming
an isolated attack which has been engineered to fall below
the detection threshold, the users/objects comprising the attack
will have absolutely no projection onto any of the top-k left
and right singular vectors respectively. In the presence of cam-
ouflage, projection of the culprit nodes may increase slightly
given some nonzero values in the corresponding indices in
one or more of the vectors. In either case, we note that nodes
involved in these attacks have the unique property of having
zero or almost-zero projections in the projected space. Given
this observation, two questions naturally arise: (a) how can we
effectively capture the extent of projection of a user or object?
and (b) is there a pattern to how users or objects project into
low-rank subspaces?
In fact, we can address the first question by taking advan-
tage of the norm-preserving property of SVD, which states that
the row vectors of a full rank decomposition and associated
projection will retain the same l2 norm or vector length as in
the original space. That is, for k = rank(A),
‖Ai‖2 = ‖(UΣ)i‖2 for i ≤ u
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Fig. 4: SRMs show correlation between the reconstruction
degree and suspiciousness of nodes. (a) and (b) show the SRMs
produced from analysis on the Twitter social graph.
In the same fashion, one can apply the norm-preserving
property to decomposition of AT to show
‖ATj‖2 = ‖(VΣ)j‖2 for j ≤ o
Since the l2 norms are preserved in a full rank decompo-
sition, it is obvious that the sum of squares of components
are also preserved. Note that for the 0-1 adjacency matrix
A we consider here, the sum of squares of components of
the ith row vector corresponds to the out-degree of user i
and the sum of squares of components of the jth column
vector corresponds to the in-degree of object j — given
these considerations, we define the degree of a node in a
given subspace as the squared l2 norm of its link vector in
that subspace. Thus, for a full rank decomposition, the out-
degree given by ‖Ai‖22 and reconstructed out-degree given by‖(UΣ)i‖22 of user i are equal. The same can be said for the
in-degree and reconstructed in-degree of object j. For rank k
decompositions where k < rank(A) (guaranteed in practical
use of spectral methods), it is clear that the true degrees upper
bound the reconstructed degrees. Thus, we can capture the
extent of projection of a user by the tuple of his true out-
degree and reconstructed out-degree, and we can capture the
extent of projection of an object by the tuple of its true in-
degree and reconstructed in-degree.
We conjecture that due to the different graph connectivity
patterns of dishonest and honest users as well as dishonest
and honest objects, their projections in terms of reconstructed
degrees should also vary. Intuitively, dishonest users who either
form isolated components or link to dishonest objects will
project poorly and have characteristically low reconstruction
degrees, whereas honest users who are well-connected to real
products and brands should project more strongly and have
characteristically higher reconstruction degrees. In fact, we find
that in real data, users and objects have certain ranges in which
they commonly reconstruct in the projected space. Figure 4
shows the OSRM (Out-link Spectral Reconstruction Map)
and ISRM (In-link Spectral Reconstruction Map) for a large,
multi-million node and multi-billion edge social graph from
Twitter, where we model follower (fan) and followee (idol)
behavior. The data is represented in heatmap form to indicate
the distribution of reconstructed degrees for each true degree.
The SRMs indicate that for each true degree, there is a tailed
distribution with most nodes reconstructing in a common range
and few nodes reconstructing as we move away from this range
in either direction. Most notably, there are a large number of
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Pr
ec
is
io
n
Percentile Threshold
Positive Negative
(a) Fans
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Pr
ec
is
io
n
Percentile Threshold
Positive Negative
(b) Idols
Fig. 5: (a) and (b) show FBOX’s strong predictive value and
low false-discovery rate in identifying suspicious accounts.
nodes with degrees up to the hundreds with an almost-zero
reconstruction, depicted by a well separated point cloud at the
bottom of both SRMs. For higher true degree values in the
thousands, nodes are more sparse and rarely project as poorly
as for lower true degrees, but many points at these degree
values reconstruct several degrees of magnitude lower than
the rest. These observations serve to substantiate our conjecture
that poorly reconstructing nodes are suspicious, but what about
the well reconstructing nodes? Interestingly, we find that nodes
which reconstruct on the high range of the spectrum for a
given degree have many links to popular (and commonly
Twitter-verified) accounts. We do not classify such behavior as
suspicious in the OSRM context, as it is common for Twitter
users to follow popular actors, musicians, brands, etc. We do
not classify such behavior as suspicious in the ISRM context
either, as popular figures tend to more commonly be followed
by other popular figures. At the bottom of the reconstruction
spectrum, however, we most commonly find accounts which
demonstrate a number of notably suspicious behaviors in the
context of their followers/followees and the content of their
Tweets — more details are given in Section VI.
Based on our intuitive conjecture and empirical verification,
we focus our FBOX algorithm on identifying nodes with
characteristically poor reconstructed degree in comparison to
other nodes of the same true degree as suspicious. Specifically,
we mark the bottom τ percent of nodes per fixed degree for
both users and objects as culprit nodes. We outline the high-
level steps of FBOX in Algorithm 1.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
A. Datasets
For our experiments we primarily use two datasets: the
who-follows-whom Twitter graph and the who-rates-what
Amazon graph. The Twitter graph was scraped by Kwak et
al. in 2010 and contains 41.7 million users with 1.5 billion
edges [11]. We showed the distribution of singular values in
Figure 3a. The Amazon ratings graph was scraped in March
2013 by McAuley and Leskovec [15] and contains 29 million
reviews from 6 million users about 2 million products. The
distribution of singular values can be seen in Figure 3b. Our
analysis is conducted both directly and via synthetic attacks.
B. FBOX on real Twitter accounts
To show our effectiveness in catching smart link fraud
attacks on real data, we conducted a classification experiment
on data from the Twitter graph. Specifically, we collected the
culprit results for suspicious fans and idols with degree at least
20 (to avoid catching unused accounts) for seven different
values of the detection threshold τ , at 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 25, 50
and 99 percentile. For each combination of τ value and user
type (fan or idol), we randomly sampled 50 accounts from the
“culprit-set” of accounts classified as suspicious by FBOX and
another 50 accounts from the remainder of the graph in a 1:1
fashion, for a total of 1400 accounts. We randomly organized
and labeled these accounts as suspicious or honest (ignoring
foreign and protected accounts) based on several criteria —
particularly, we identified suspicious behavior as accounts with
some combination of the following characteristics:
• Suspension by Twitter since data collection
• Spammy or malicious tweets (links to adware/malware)
• Suspicious username, or followers/followees have suspi-
cious usernames (with common prefixes/suffixes)
• Very few tweets (<5) but numerous (>20) followees who
are themselves suspicious
• Sparse profile but numerous (>20) followees who are
themselves suspicious
Figure 5 shows how the performance of FBOX varies with
the threshold τ for Twitter fans and idols. As evidenced by the
results, FBOX is able to correctly discern suspicious accounts
with 0.93+ precision for τ ≤ 1 for both fans and idols. And
as expected, increasing τ results in lower precision. As with
many informational retrieval and spam detection problems,
there are an unbounded number of false negatives, making
recall effectively impossible to calculate. Rather, we use the
negative precision and observe that it increases as we increase
τ . Ultimately, because FBOX is meant to be a complementary
method to catch new cases of fraud, we do not believe that
missing some of the attackers already caught by other methods
is a major concern. With these considerations, we recommend
conservative threshold values for practitioner use. On Twitter
data, we found roughly 150 thousand accounts classified as
suspicious between the SRMs for τ = 1.
C. Complementarity of FBOX
As mentioned before, FBOX is complementary to spectral
techniques and is effective in catching smart attacks that adver-
saries could engineer to avoid detection by these techniques.
We demonstrate this claim using both synthetically formulated
attacks on the Amazon network as well as comparing the
performance of both FBOX and SPOKEN on the Twitter
network. In the first experiment, we inject random attacks of
scale 100 (100× 100) and 400 (400× 400), each with density
p = 0.5 into the Amazon graph and compare the effectiveness
of spectral subspace plots and SRMs in spotting these attacks.
Figure 6a shows the spectral subspace plot for the 1st and
15th components of the SVD, corresponding to one naturally
existing community and the blatant attack, respectively. The
plot clearly shows nodes involved in the blatant attack as a
spoke pattern, but groups the nodes involved in the small attack
along with many honest nodes that reconstruct poorly in these
components at the origin point. However, in Figure 6b, we
see that the smaller injection is identified as clearly suspicious
with distinct separation from other legitimate behavior.
We additionally tested both FBOX and SPOKEN on a
number of injections sizes, each random attacks with p = 0.5.
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
U1
U1
5
 
 
Large attack (400)
Small attack (100)
(a) Spectral subspace plot
In−degree
R
ec
on
st
ru
ct
ed
 In
−d
eg
re
e
 
 
2 6 18 49 131 350 932 2482 6612 17612
2.79478e−30
1.63759e−26
9.59539e−23
5.62238e−19
3.29441e−15
1.93034e−11
1.13108e−07
0.000662749
3.88335
22754.3
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Large attack (400)
Small attack (100)
(b) ISRM
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 50  125  200  275  350  425  500
Pe
rc
en
t D
et
ec
te
d
Attack Size
SpokEn fBox
(c) Method complementarity
Fig. 6: FBOX and SPOKEN are complementary, with FBOX detecting smaller stealth attacks missed by SPOKEN. (a) shows
how spectral subspace plots identify blatant attacks but ignore smaller ones. (b) shows the ISRM plot for the same injections,
clearly identifying the suspiciousness of the smart attack. (c) depicts the complementary nature of FBOX and spectral methods
in detecting attacks at various scales.
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Fig. 7: (a), (b) and (c) show FBOX’s robustness to moderate amounts of camouflage for attack sizes of 100, 250 and 500.
Figure 6c shows the fraction of the attacking fans caught by
each algorithm. As seen in the figure, the two methods are
clearly complementary, with FBOX catching all attacks that
SPOKEN misses. This verifies the analysis in Section III and
substantiates FBOX’s suitability for catching stealth attacks that
produce leading singular value σ′ < σk.
In our second experiment, we compared the performance
of both FBOX and SPOKEN on a sample of 65743 accounts
selected from the Twitter graph. For each of these accounts,
we queried the Twitter API to collect information regarding
whether the account was suspended or had posted Tweets
promoting adware/malware (checked via Google SafeBrows-
ing), and if so we marked the account as fraudulent. This
ground truth marking allows us to unbiasedly measure the
complementarity of FBOX and SPOKEN in catching users that
are surely malicious. Of these users, 4025 were marked as
fraudulent via Twitter (3959) and Google SafeBrowsing (66).
For rank k = 50, SPOKEN produced 8211 suspicious accounts
whereas FBOX (with τ = 1) produced 149899. The user sets
identified by both methods were found to be completely dis-
tinct, suggesting that the methods are indeed complementary.
Furthermore, FBOX identified 1133 suspicious accounts from
the sampled dataset, of which only 347 were caught via Twitter
and Google SafeBrowsing, suggesting that roughly 70% of
FBOX-classified suspicious accounts are missed by Twitter.
D. FBOX in the face of camouflage
One key point in dealing with intelligent attackers is en-
suring that FBOX is robust in detecting attacks with moderate
amounts of camouflage. To measure our performance in such a
setting, we ran FBOX on a variety of attack sizes in our target
range and for each attack varied the amount of camouflage
added. In our model, we include camouflage by following
honest accounts at random. For a random attack of size
n× n and edge probability p, we vary the percent of idols of
fraudulent fans that are camouflage: for 0% camouflage each
fan follows the pn customers only and for 50% camouflage
each attacker node follows pn customers and pn random
honest idols — in general, the percent of camouflage r for
g camouflage links is defined as 100gg+pn . We ran this test for
attacks of size 100, 250, and 500 (all below the σ25 = 1143.4
detection threshold) with p = 0.5 on the Twitter graph.
Figure 7 demonstrates FBOX’s robustness — for all config-
urations of attack size and camouflage, we catch all customer
idols and over 80% of fraudulent fans. As attack size increases,
increased camouflage is less impactful (intuitively, larger at-
tacks are more flagrant), with FBOX catching over 90% of the
fraudulent fans even with 50% camouflage.
Analysis on fame, where customers buying links also have
honest links was not conducted. Customer fame is the analog
of attacker camouflage. However, we expect similar results
in detection of accounts in the presence of fame given the
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Fig. 8: FBOX scales linearly on the size of input data.
symmetry of SVD and FBOX’s disjoint user/object recon-
struction. However, the presence of fame is less realistic in
many applications — for example, in the Twitter context, it
is difficult for a spammy account to get honest fans whereas
fraudulent fans can follow real idols at will.
E. Scalability of FBOX
The running time of FBOX is dominated by the (linear)
large matrix-vector multiplication per iteration of the Lanczos
algorithm to compute SVD for large, sparse matrices. Figure 8
depicts the linear runtime of FBOX for k = 25 while varying
number of non-zeros.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we approached the problem of distinguishing
dishonest attackers and their customers from honest users in
the context of online social network or web-service graphs
using a graph-based approach (using the adjacency matrix
representing user/object relationships). Our main contributions
are:
1) Theoretical analysis: We examine several state-of-the-
art fraud detection methods from an adversarial point-
of-view and provide theoretical results pertaining to the
susceptibility of these methods to various types of attacks.
2) FBOX algorithm: We detail FBOX, a method motivated
by addressing the blind-spots discovered in theoretical
analysis, for detecting a class of stealth attacks which
previous methods are effectively unable to detect.
3) Effectiveness on real data: We apply FBOX to a large
Twitter who-follows-whom dataset from 2010 and dis-
cover many tens of thousands of suspicious users whose
accounts remain active to date
Our experiments show that our method is scalable, effective
in detecting a complementary range of attacks to existing
methods and robust to a reasonable degree of camouflage for
small and moderately sized stealth attacks.
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